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Media Access to Videotape Evidence in

Criminal Trials
By

GEOFFREY ROBINSON*

I
Introduction
The recent Abscam' trials focused attention on a hitherto
largely unlitigated issue: whether the media may copy and2
televise videotapes entered into evidence in criminal trials.
* Member, Third Year Class; BA., University of California, Berkeley, 1978.
1. "Abscam" is the popular label for a series of undercover operations by federal
and state law enforcement agencies. Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
conceived of and implemented a scheme designed, in essence, to test the probity of
public officials by offering them bribes. Undercover agents posed as representatives of
Abdul Enterprises Ltd., (hence "Abscam"), a fictitious middle eastern business purportedly owned by wealthy individuals seeking investments in the United States. The
agents approached several members of Congress and state and local officials, offering
large sums of cash in return for certain favors, including sponsorship of private immigration bills in Congress, and use of their positions to influence various actions of the
Executive Branch.
The operation resulted in a series of indictments against public officials, businessmen, and lawyers, including, inter alia, Congressmen Michael 0. Myers of the First
Congressional District of Pennsylvania; Frank Thompson Jr. of the Fourth District of.
New Jersey; John M. Murphy of the Seventeenth District of New York; John Jenrette
of the Sixth District of South Carolina; Angelo J. Errichetti, the Mayor of Camden,
New Jersey; and Howard L. Criden, a Philadelphia lawyer.
During the course of the operation, the activities of the agents and their targets were
covertly recorded on video and audio tapes. These tapes were admitted into evidence
and shown to the juries in several of the Abscan trials.
Many of the details of the operation may be found in United States v. Jannotti, 501 F.
Supp. 1182, 1193-1201 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
2. Broadcasters have a manifest interest in obtaining and televising this material:
it is not only topical and newsworthy, but is also the ideal supplement to television
news coverage of a trial, inasmuch as videotape is the medium of the broadcaster.
Moreover, beyond the obvious financial interest derived from heightened viewer interest, broadcast of this material is consistent with the broadcasters' legitimate function as news disseminators. This function was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980):
Instead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by
word of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through
the print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of
functioning as surrogates for the public.
Id. at 572-73.
As a practical matter.., the institutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief
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Two federal appellate courts recently dealt with this issue, and
came out strongly in favor of such a right. In In re Application
of National Broadcasting Co. (Myers) 3 the Second Circuit
held that "only the most compelling circumstances"4 would
justify restrictions upon inspection and copying of physical evidence introduced at a public session of a trial. The Third Circuit, in United States v. Criden,5 agreed, finding a strong
presumption that material introduced into evidence should be
made available in a manner suitable for copying and broadcast.
Both courts premised this right upon the strong common law
presumption in favor of public inspection of items introduced
into evidence,6 without reaching the issue of whether a ban on
inspecting or copying the videotapes would offend the First or
Sixth Amendments. 7
Criden and Myers involved Abscam defendants 8 whose stabeneficiary of a right of access because it serves as the "agent" of interested
citizens, and funnels information about trials to a large number of individuals.
Id. at 586 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
3. 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980).
4. Id. at 952.
5. 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981).
6. Both courts used the terms "common-law presumption" and "common-law
right" interchangeably, although arguably they are not synonymous. The Supreme
Court in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 passim (1978), also
used the phrases "common-law right of access" and "presumption ... in favor of ac..
cess" interchangeably. This note will follow this practice.
7. The Supreme Court had earlier rejected media claims of a constitutional right
of access to the tape recordings played and introduced into evidence at the trials of
several Watergate defendants. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
8. The appeal in Myers stemmed from the first of the Abscam trials, held in the
Eastern District of New York. The defendants, Congressman Michael 0. Myers, Angelo J. Errichetti, Louis J. Johanson, a member of the Philadelphia City Council, and
Howard L. Criden, were charged with bribery and related offenses. Videotapes of their
activities were admitted in evidence and comprised the critical evidence against them.
The defendants did not attack the authenticity of the tapes, and did not dispute the
occurrence of the events portrayed. Their defense, in essence, was that they never had
any intention of performing the actions requested by the "investors", and, in effect,
were defrauding them by obtaining cash without reciprocal obligation. Myers, 635 F.2d
at 948.
The courtroom was equipped to permit presentation of the tapes to the jury, and the
tapes could also be seen and heard by journalists and members of the public seated in
the spectator section. Verbatim transcripts of the tapes were distributed to the jury
and members of the press. Id.
On the fourth day of the trial, three television networks requested permission to
copy the tapes simultaneously with their presentation to the jury. After hearing oral
argument on the broadcasters' application, the district court granted their request,
subject to the qualification that the tapes be copied at the close of the trial day on
which the tape was admitted. In so ruling, the court noted that "'the tapes themselves
are evidence [and] they are, under common law principles, available to the public and
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tus as public figures supported the broadcasters' arguments in
favor of access to videotaped evidence.9 However, the increasing use of this type of evidence by federal and state law enforcement agencies betokens a recurrence of the access issue
in cases involving less luminary defendants and radically different fact situations. This note will examine the arguments
for and against the right to copy and broadcast videotape evidence, concentrating upon the "public forum values" favoring
access, and the potentially deleterious effects of broadcast
upon the defendant's right to a fair trial.

II
Factors Favoring Access and Broadcast
A.

The Common Law Right of Access to Public Records

The right of access to public records has its roots in the early
common law.10 However, unlike the English common law,
the press,' unless 'there is a strong showing of reasons why they should not be made
available.'" Id. at 949 (citing Trial Tr. at 1480). The court stayed its order to permit the
defendants to appeal the ruling, and the Second Circuit granted expedited review. Id.
During the pendency of the appeal, the jury returned guilty verdicts against all the
defendants. Id. at 949.
The appeal in Criden followed the trial of Louis Johanson and Howard Criden in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Prior to trial, the three major television networks
and Westinghouse Broadcasting, Inc. sought permission to copy any tapes introduced
into evidence. The district court released transcripts of the tapes to the press and public, but denied the broadcasters' request to copy them. Among the reasons cited for
the denial were the pendency of the appeal in Myers and the pendency of the trial of
two other Abscam defendants, George X. Schwartz and Harry P. Jannotti, members of
the Philadelphia City Council. Criden, 648 F.2d at 816.
During the trial, the broadcasters renewed their application, citing the fact that the
Second Circuit, in Myers, had unanimously affirmed the district court's order releasing
the tapes, and the Supreme Court had refused to stay that order, 449 U.S. 956 (1980).
Thus, the videotapes introduced at that trial had been broadcast to the public. Additionally, the Schwartz-Jannotti trial had concluded with guilty verdicts against the defendants. Criden, 648 F.2d at 814. Despite these intervening developments, the district
court again denied the broadcasters' application, stating that "whatever the force of
the presumption [in favor of disclosure], I am ... convinced that the circumstances of
the present case are indeed sufficiently extraordinary to require denial of the broadcasters' application." United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 859 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The
broadcasters then sought and obtained expedited review by the court of appeals.
Criden, 648 F.2d at 816.
9. The Myers court found the presumption in favor of access "especially strong in
a case like this where the evidence shows the actions of public officials, both the defendants and law enforcement personnel." 635 F.2d at 952. The court in Criden noted
that the involvement of elected officials created a "legitimate public interest in the
proceedings far beyond the usual criminal case." 648 F.2d at 822.
10. See H. CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNow; LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC
RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS

135-136 (1953).
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which required a party seeking access to show a sufficient interest therein," American decisions have generally favored access for all citizens. 2 The right of access to judicial records,
including transcripts, pleadings, evidence, and other materials
submitted to the court, was affirmed as early as 1894, in Ex
ParteDrawbaugh.3 There, the court refused to seal the pleadings in a patent case, stating that attempts to maintain secrecy
in court records would conflict with "the common understanding of what belongs to a public court of record, to which all perrecords, according to
sons have the right of access, and to its
4
practice."'
and
usage
established
long
The right to copy being a corollary of the right to inspect, the
courts early adjusted the common law to reflect changes in
technology, permitting copying by photographic and mechanical means.'5 Nor has the right been limited to written documents: other forms of records such as computer tape 16 and
audio tape 7 have been included within its broad scope. 8 The
11. See, e.g., Browne v. Cumming, 109 Eng. Rep. 377, 378 (K.B. 1829). See also Barrett, Freedom of the Press,American Style, in ABA, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY: ENGLJSH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES COMPARED 214, 238-39 (1977).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Burka, 289 A.2d 376 (D.C. 1972); Charlottesville Newspapers, Inc. v. Berry, 215 Va. 116, 206 S.E.2d 267 (1974); Nowack v. Fuller, 243 Mich. 200,
219 N.W. 749 (1928). See generally H. CROSS, supra note 10, at 135-52; 20 AM. JuR. 2D
Courts § 61 (1965); Annot. 84 A.L.R. 3D 598 (1978).
13. 2 App. D.C. 404 (1894).
14. Id. at 407-08. The right to inspect judicial records has been premised upon the
same policy considerations as those underlying open trials, see notes 29-41 and accompanying text, infra. See also United States v. Burka, 289 A.2d at 397; Cohen v. Everett
City Council, 85 Wash. 2d 385, 388-389, 535 P.2d 801, 803 (1975). Access to pleadings,
transcripts, and other records permits a more complete public understanding of a trial
than attendance alone. See generally First Nat'l Bank of Pocatello v. Poling, 42 Idaho
636, 248 P. 19, (1926).
15. See, e.g., Moore v. Bd. of Freeholders of Mercer County, 76 N.J. Super. 396, 408,
184 A.2d 748, 754, modified, 39 N.J. 26, 180 A.2d 676 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962). ("To
ignore the efficacy and practical worth of [photocopying] equipment... would substantially impair [the] right to inspect and copy." Id.)
16. See Menge v. City of Manchester, 113 N.H. 533, 311 A.2d 116 (1973); Ortiz v.
Jaramillo, 82 N.M. 445, 483 P.2d 500 (1971).
17. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1977); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 753(b)
(1976) (right to inspect stenographer's notes or mechanical recordings as well as trial
transcript).
18. Once information has been obtained from court records, the First Amendment
protects its dissemination. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the
Court held that once information is disclosed in public court documents, the press
cannot constitutionally be sanctioned for publishing it. See also Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). In Warner Communications,435 U.S. 589, the Court reaffirmed the holding in Cox Broadcasting, but rejected the argument that the First
Amendment guaranteed the press initial access to court records as opposed to the
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Supreme Court, in Nixon v. Warner Communications,Inc.,19
recently acknowledged that "the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents."2 0
Although the presumption in favor of access has long been
recognized, its strength has not yet been clearly determined.
The Supreme Court in Warner Communications found it "difficult to distill from the relatively few judicial decisions a comprehensive definition of. . . the right of access or to identify all
the factors to be weighed in determining whether access is appropriate."2 1 The Criden court characterized the presumption
as "strong,"2 2 while the Second Circuit in Myers stated that
"only the most compelling circumstances should prevent contemporaneous public access. '2 3 The Supreme Court in Warner
Communications declined to assess the strength of the preright to inspect and copy jusumption,2 4 but stressed that "the
'25
dicial records is not absolute.
In whatever manner the strength of the presumption is
gauged, it should not vary according to the form of the evidence. With videotape, as with other forms of evidence, such
as documents or demonstrative devices, the issue is whether
the media may disseminate evidence in the same form in
which it was presented at trial. Dissemination of any evidence
introduced at trial-regardless of its form-enhances the pubright to disseminate information once access has been obtained. Id. at 609. See also
Oklahoma Publishing Corp. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (First Amendment
violated by a court order enjoining the press from disseminating the name of a minor
whose identity was learned by the media during the minor's juvenile detention hearing); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1977).
19. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
20. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 597 (footnotes omitted). The right of access to public records has also been accorded substantial statutory protection. The
Freedom of Information Act was enacted in 1966, Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487,
80 Stat. 250 (1970) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552), and was extensively amended in 1974.
Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1461 (1974) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 552, 552a). Most states have promulgated statutes protecting access to public
records. See Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 63 MICH. L
REV. 971, 1163, n.1169 (1975). Such statutes are, however, proving difficult to interpret
and apply. Barrett, Freedom of the Press, supra note 11, at 239, Research Study, Public
Access to Information, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 177-462 (1973).
21. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598-99.
22. Criden, 648 F.2d at 823.
23. Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
24. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 602.
25. Id. at 598.
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lic's understanding of the events which were the subject of the
trial proceedings. 26 The fact that the evidence is in video form,
far from militating against release, provides a stronger justification for its dissemination: broadcast of videotapes which
were shown at trial provides an exact replication of the trial
court experience, and hence is supported by the same policy
considerations underlying open trials.2 The common law presumption of access to all public records therefore weighs heavily in favor of allowing broadcasters access to videotape
evidence introduced at trial.
B.

"Public Forum Values"

In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia2 8 the Supreme Court
held that public access to criminal trials is guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.2 9 The Criden court found
that the interests advanced by open trials, which the court
termed "public forum values," also favored rebroadcast of evidence introduced at trials for wider dissemination. °
The "public forum values" relied upon in Criden were discussed in Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion and in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers.
The Chief Justice reviewed the development of criminal trials,
concluding that "at the time when our organic laws were
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long
been presumptively open.13 1 The presumption of openness
was deemed to inhere in the very nature of a criminal trial, because it assured fairness in the proceedings and32discouraged
perjury, misconduct, and secret bias or partiality.
While acknowledging the importance of a public trial to the
26. See generally Criden, 648 F.2d at 824.
27. See notes 29-41 and accompanying text, infra.
28. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
29. Prior to Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court had long adhered to a presumption of openness in criminal trials, though not expressing this in terms of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 361 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367, 374 (1947).
Moreover, the Court had frequently recognized that public policy strongly favored
public knowledge of legal proceedings in courts of record and hence dissemination of
court records by the media. See Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 491-96 and cases
cited therein.
30. Criden, 648 F.2d at 821-22.
31. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569.
32. Id.
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defendant, the Chief Justice gave great weight to the "significant community therapeutic value"3 3 of open trials in "provid34
ing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion..
Open trials satisfied a "fundamental, natural yearning to see
justice done-or even the urge for retribution.135 Only through
providing an opportunity for the public to observe the system
in general and its workings in specific cases can acceptance
and support of the judicial process be obtained.3 6 For the Chief
Justice, the educative and therapeutic effects of open trials
were critical in ensuring that "the means used to achieve jusfrom public acceptance of
tice must have the support derived
37
both the process and its results.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan also consulted
historical and current practices respecting open trials, finding
that "[a] s a matter of law and virtually immemorial custom"
open trials had been an "essentially unwavering rule. 3 8 This
tradition of openness implied "the favorable judgment of experience. '39 Above and beyond assuring the defendant a fair
trial, public access, for Justice Brennan, comprised one of the
"checks and balances" of our system, providing "an effective
restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. ' 40 Like the Chief
Justice, Justice Brennan stressed the value of open trials in
demonstrating the fairness of the law and assuring respect for
procedural rights and equal dispensation of justice. Open trials thus furthered the "objective of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice.'
The Criden court deemed the public forum values relied
upon in Richmond Newspapers to be equally significant to the
issue of whether the media may broadcast videotape evidence.' However, in view of its disposition of the case of nonconstitutional grounds,4 3 the court declined to decide whether
there existed room for a constitutional right of access to court
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
(1936)

Id. at 570.
Id. at 571.
Id.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
Id.
Id. at 596 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270).
Id. at 594-595.
Criden, 648 F.2d at 821.
See generally Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
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records" based upon the First Amendment as construed in
Richmond Newspapers.4 5 The court nevertheless found that
the analyses in Richmond Newspapers which produced the
constitutional result provided strong support for reliance on
the common law right of access to trial materials in the case
before it.46

The court recognized that an application to copy evidence for
the purpose of broadcast did not present the same issue as that
raised where the public sought to attend a trial.4 7 In Criden,
the trial had been open, the videotapes publicly played, and
44. There is a speculative possibility, noted in Criden, 648 F.2d at 82, that Richmond Newspapers heralds a more expansive view of the First Amendment's application to court records than was followed in Warner Communications. A thorough
analysis of this possibility would be beyond the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court's ruling in Warner Communications should not end all discussion concerning whether the First Amendment affords a right to inspect judicial records. Contra Comment, All Courts Shall Be Open: The Public's Right to View Judicial
Proceedingsand Records, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 311, 342 (1979). As previously noted, the public
forum interests identified in Richmond Newspapers as underlying the First Amendment open trial guarantee are closely related to those advanced by permitting liberal
access to court records. See notes 29-41 and accompanying text, supra. The Criden
court pointed out that the only First Amendment right explicitly rejected in Warner
Communications was that possessed by the press. 648 F.2d at 821 n.6. The First
Amendment rights of the general public were not addressed. Id. It can be argued,
therefore, that Richmond Newspapers supports the right of public access to judicial
records through the medium of the press.
This line of argument, however, suffers from several prominent defects. While the
First Amendment rights of the press to information about trials may be no greater
than those of the general public, see Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 608-610, they
are at least equal. See Cox Broadcasting,420 U.S. at 491-92. It is inconceivable, therefore, that the outcome in Warner Communications would have been different if respondents had been members of the public at large. Warner Communications
emphasized that "[t] he requirement of a public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of
members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to report what they have
observed." Id. at 610. As Judge Weis pointed out in Criden, this statement was referred to in Chandlerv. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 569 (1981), with no indication that it was
affected in any way by Richmond Newspapers. Criden, 648 F.2d at 830 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting).
Finally, the mere assertion that the right of access to judicial records advances the
same interests as those served by open trials does not, by itself, invite constitutional
protection. Such interests are equally well, if not better served by televising the trial
itself. Yet, as the Supreme Court has made clear, "there is no constitutional right to
have [live witness] testimony recorded and broadcast." Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S.
at 569 (quoting Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 610). Thus, in the absence of a
more authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court than the holding in Warner
Communications, it must be assumed that there is no constitutional right of access by
either the press or the public to judicial records.
45. Criden, 648 F.2d at 821.
46. Id. at 821-22.
47. Id. at 822.
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the broadcasters provided with transcripts.4 8 The court nonetheless determined that broader dissemination would advance
the same interests as those protected by the open trial guarantee of Richmond Newspapers.4 9 The same values of "community catharsis,"50 public supervision and inspection of
courtroom proceedings, and public awareness, favored wider
dissemination of the evidence introduced at trial."1
The court observed that the public's opportunity to be present at trial proceedings, secured by Richmond Newspapers,
was subject to certain practical limitations such as the size of
the courtroom. 5 2 As noted in Richmond Newspapers, instead
of acquiring information about trials from personal observation
or by word of mouth, people now acquire it largely through
print and electronic media. This, in a sense, "validates the media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public. 5 3 The
Criden court concluded that the public forum values emphasized in Richmond Newspapers could be "fully vindicated only
if the opportunity for personal observation is extended to persons other than those few who can manage to attend the trial
in person. '
Judge Weis, concurring and dissenting in Criden, criticized
the majority opinion's strong reliance upon Richmond Newspapers as having "an unfortunate tendency to conjure up constitutional confusion about the right of access at issue here. 5 5
The judge pointed out that Warner Communications had underscored the distinction between attendance at trial and access to court records. The issue there was not whether the
press must be "permitted access to public information to
which the public generally is guaranteed access, but whether
these copies of ... tapes-to which the public has never had
'56
physical access-must be made available for copying.
Warner Communications established that the public trial requirement was satisfied "by the opportunity of members of the
public and the press to attend the trial and to report what they
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573.
Criden, 648 F.2d at 822.
Id. at 830 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting).
Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 609.
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had observed." 7 The decision as to whether records should be
made available for copying involved a different issue which necessitated "weighing the interests advanced by the parties in
light of the public interest and the duty of the courts."5 8 The
fact that the broadcasters required the court's cooperation in
obtaining the tapes gave rise to a responsibility to "exercise an
informed discretion as to release of the tapes, with a sensitive
appreciation of the circumstances that led to their production." 59 'This
responsibility did not permit "copying upon
60
demand.

Undeterred by this language, the Criden court interpreted
Warner Communications as supporting a presumption of release. 61 The court viewed contrary language in Warner Communications as being addressed to the unique circumstances
of that case: a third party subpoena vigorously opposed by the
President of the United States. The court conceded that the
presumption favoring release could be accurately assessed
only in relationship to the factors which would justify withholding access. 2 The court nonetheless concluded that the
common law right of access, when buttressed by the significant
interest of the public in observation, participation, and comment on trial events, rendered the presumption in favor of release undeniable. The educational and informational benefits
derived from broadcast of evidence introduced at trial gave rise
to a "strong presumption" 3 that such material should be made
available in a manner suitable for broader dissemination."
57. Id. at 610.
58. Id. at 602 (footnote omitted).
59. Id. at 603.
60. Id.
61. Criden, 648 F.2d at 823.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. The holding in Myers was also premised upon the strong public interest in
knowing what happens in the courtroom, 635 F.2d at 951, and upon the notion that
"[wJhat transpires in the court room is public property," id. (quoting Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367, 374 (1974)). The court concluded that once evidence has become known to
members of the public through attendance at trial, only the most extraordinary circumstances could justify "restrictions on the opportunity of those not physically in

attendance at the courtroom to see and hear the evidence, when it is in a form that
readily permits sight and sound reproduction." Id. at 952 (footnote omitted).
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III

Factors Weighing Against Access
A. Unique Properties of Videotape
The district court in Criden denied the broadcasters' application to copy and televise the tapes introduced at trial, focusing
upon "the very great difference between videotape evidence
and other forms of evidence."65 Whatever the strength of the
common law right of access, it clearly developed initially in response to requests for access to documentary evidence, though
it has been adapted without much difficulty to changes in technology.66 Nevertheless, videotape evidence is sufficiently
unique and powerful to evoke enhanced concerns for the possibility of abuse, the effect upon present or potential jurors or
implicated third parties, and the potential infringement of privacy rights.
In Criden, the district court determined that the unique features of videotape justified a departure from the common law
rule. The court emphasized the great difference between the
impact of a videotape of actual events upon the viewer and that
of the written or spoken word upon the reader or listener.67
Even eyewitness testimony could not match the effectiveness
or convincing power of a videotape of the events. 8 For the district court, "[t] he viewer of videotape becomes virtually a participant in the events portrayed,"69 and when the videotape
reveals a crime being committed, "it simply leaves nothing
more to be said."70 The convincing power and perceived reliability of such evidence invites its presentation to the jury, but
only under controlled courtroom conditions. The district court,
however, was concerned that dissemination beyond the courtroom could lead to "irreparable harm, both to persons whose
interests are entitled to protection, and to the judicial process
itself."'"
There is little question that whatever risks are presented by
the dissemination of documentary evidence to the public are
greatly magnified in the case of videotape. The impact of wide65. United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 859 (E.D. Pa. 1980).

66. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text, supra.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Criden, 501 F. Supp. at 859-60.
Id. at 860.
Id.
Id.

71. Id.
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spread dissemination of video evidence showing the commission of a crime increases the likelihood that the defendant will
be subjected to the detrimental side effects 72 of the enhanced
notoriety which results from community awareness of the defendant's criminality. The risks of infringing the defendant's
right to a fair trial 73 are also increased, an example being exposure to persons who may sit as jurors in future cases involving
present or prospective defendants.
The potentially deleterious impact of broadcast upon innocent third parties or victims who appear on the videotape is
also a significant consideration. In In re Application of KSTP
Television7 4 a television station sought to copy and broadcast
videotapes which showed conduct prior to the rape of a kidnapping victim. The videotape had been shown at trial and transcripts furnished to the media. The court nonetheless denied
media access to the tapes, stating that "[t]here must then
come some point where the public's right to information must
bow to the dignity of the individual person." 75 Further dissemination, the court decided, would not only violate the victim's
privacy rights, but would also "lend the court's approval to the
commercial exploitation of a voice and photographic display
catering to prurient interests without proper76public purpose or
corresponding assurance of public benefit."
Such cases are arguably somewhat extreme and, indeed,
may fall under the proscription in Warner Communications of
release of evidence that will be used as a "vehicle for improper
purposes. ' 77 Judge Weis, in Criden, pointed to the fact that a
television station would seek to broadcast such evidence as a
"powerful justification for the principle that access to court
records must be limited by judicial discretion. '78 He analogized this discretion to that applicable when more traditional
evidence is sought to be disseminated, such as gruesome photographs or private medical records.79 The risks incident to
widespread dissemination of powerful evidence are, of course,
equally present in cases in which the court has little or no con72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See notes 86-90 and accompanying text, infra.
See notes 98-103 and accompanying text, infra.
504 F. Supp. 360 (D.C. Minn. 1980).
Id. at 362.
Id. at 362 (footnote omitted).
Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598.
Criden, 648 F.2d at 831 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 832.
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trol over its broadcast-as, for instance, where the media itself
creates and owns the videotapes, which it televises before the
trial. However, as noted by the district court in Criden, it is
one thing to say that adverse effects are beyond the reach of
courts, and quite another "to suggest that courts may, with propriety, actively intervene to bring them about, in particular
cases." 80 Warner Communications also emphasized "the crucial fact that the [broadcasters] require a court's cooperation
in furthering their commerical plans."'" It is in such cases as
KSTP, involving the "extraordinary circumstances" noted in
Myers,82 that the decision whether to permit access is most appropriately committed to the "informed discretion"8 3 of the
trial court. In the average case, while discretion is still technically exercised, the heavy common law presumption should
dictate the result. Discretion becomes most important in cases
in which strong countervailing considerations threaten to offset the common law presumption and the public's interest. In
cases involving allegedly gruesome or pornographic pictorial
representations, the unique features of videotape may well
counsel against release. Only the trial court, having seen the
tapes and being aware of the circumstances which led to their
production and their potential impact, is equipped to make the
decision whether to grant access.
B.

Rebroadcast as "Enhanced Punishment"

In Chandlerv. Florida the Court stated that "[t] he concurring opinion of Chief Justice Warren ... in Estes8" can fairly
be read as viewing the very broadcast of some trials as poten80. Criden, 501 F. Supp. at 860.
81. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 602-603.
82. Myers, 635 F.2d at 952. The decision whether circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary to warrant denial of access is made initially by the trial court, but remains
subject to appellate review. Thus, in Criden, the trial court had determined that "the
circumstances of the present case are indeed sufficiently extraordinary to require denial of the broadcasters' application," 501 F. Supp. at 859. This determination was reversed on appeal. The Court of Appeals, while recognizing that no two judges can give
exactly the same weight to factors which enter into a discretionary decision, concluded
that the trial court accorded too little weight to the strong common law presumption of
access and the public forum benefits derived from broadcast, 648 F.2d at 829. Similarly,
the trial judge was found to have accorded too much weight to factors which the Court
of Appeals deemed irrelevant or capable of resolution in some manner short of denial
of the application, id.
83. Warner Communications,435 U.S. at 603.
84. 449 U.S. 560.
85. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1964) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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tially a form of punishment.... 86 The possibility that rebroadcast of video evidence would cause penalties not
prescribed by law to be "visited upon the accused and, more
importantly, upon innocent relatives and friends" was of major
7
Such unofficial sancconcern to the district court in Criden.1
tions were recognized as inevitable and, indeed, as forming an
important, albeit unofficial, part of the sanctions imposed by
society upon lawbreakers.8 8 However, the district court determined that the greater and more widespread the publicity, the
more likely it would be that such enhanced punishment would
be imposed. This would effectively ensure different treatment
for those defendants unlucky enough to have their misdeeds
recorded on tape. The district court did not believe that courts
should "intentionally create, or vastly increase the dissemination of, unfavorable publicity" by releasing such evidence. 89
The court analogized the broadcast of videotapes to "parading
a convicted defendant through the streets, or ... exhibiting
him in a cage or in the stocks."90 Courts should not destroy the
balance between public interest and human dignity by creating
a situation in which "the defendant's initial misconduct is
graphically portrayed in every living room in America." 91
Chief Justice Warren, in Estes v. Texas, noted that television
coverage of selected cases "singles out certain defendants" 92
subjecting them to prejudicial conditions not experienced by
others. Chief Justice Burger, in Chandler v. Florida, pointed
out that the selection of which trials or portions of trials to be
broadcast would inevitably be that of the broadcasters, not the
judge, and would be governed by such factors as the nature of
the crime or the status of the accused.93 The unanswered question for the Chandler Court was whether "electronic coverage
will bring public humiliation upon the accused with such randomness that it will evoke due process concerns by being 'unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning' is
The district court in Criden suggested that the
'unusual.' ,
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Chandler, 449 U.S. at 580.
Criden, 501 F. Supp. at 860,
Id.
Id. at 861.
Id. at 860.
Id.
Estes, 381 U.S. at 565 (Warren, C. ., concurring).
Chandler,449 U.S. at 580.
Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972)).
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"virtually indistinguishbroadcasting of video evidence was
95
able from televising the trial itself."
This analogy is, at best, inexact. As noted in Criden, the
main apprehension where the trial is sought to be televised
concerns the effect which contemporaneous broadcast may
have upon the trial participants, and thus the fairness of the
trial itself. 6 This factor is irrelevant when the material sought
to be broadcast is merely a videotape of a preexisting event:
the persons on the tapes cannot change their behavior in anticipation of a television audience. Thus, unlike cases in which
live testimony is sought to be televised, there is no concern
that awareness of dissemination beyond the courtroom will
have a distorting impact on the trial.
The defendant should therefore bear the burden of demonstrating that release of the tapes will result in enhanced punishment. This would require more than merely a showing that
greater embarrassment or unpleasantness will accompany enhanced community awareness of the defendant's purported
criminality. As previously noted, the publicity which attends a
criminal case, and its effects upon the defendant, comprise part
of the sanctions which society imposes upon those who commit crimes. The publicity and awareness generated by broadcast of videotapes showing the actual commission of a crime
will, in most cases, exceed that which would attend the trial if
no videotapes were involved. On the other hand, cases involving particularly heinous or spectacular crimes are likely to generate more publicity9 7 than those involving less serious crimes
in which videotapes are broadcast. Media access to videotapes
should not, therefore, be denied merely upon the assertion that
adverse publicity will result.9 8
C.

Interference with Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial

Possibly the greatest concern in the decision whether to permit rebroadcast of video evidence is the risk of infringing upon
the right to a fair trial of present or prospective defendants.
95. Criden, 501 F. Supp. at 863.
96. Criden, 648 F.2d at 829.
97. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
98. This determination was implicit in the Criden court's conclusion that "without
any evidence to the contrary ... rebroadcast [of video evidence] cannot appropriately
be considered to be enhanced punishment of the defendants." Criden, 648 F.2d at 825.
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The Supreme Court has frequently underscored the right of
the accused to "a fair and reliable determination of guilt."9 9
The decision as to the accused's guilt or innocence must be "induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not
by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public
print."'10 A trial court must, therefore, diligently avoid significant risks of impairing the defendant's right to a fair trial' 01
and may halt "the flow of prejudicial publicity at its0°2source,
1
before it is obtained by representatives of the press.
Broadcasting of evidence introduced at trial presents several
prospective threats to fair trial rights that are potentially
greater than those encountered by publication of accounts of
the trial, documents, or even audio tapes. A videotape constitutes powerfully convincing evidence and, as noted above,
when it shows a crime being committed, "it simply leaves nothing more to be said.' 10 3 The principal problem with broadcast
involves the impact upon present or prospective jurors of exposure to such powerful evidence. The effects of repeated exposure to critical evidence upon impanelled jurors, or upon those
who may become jurors in future trials, are considerations
which should be carefully weighed in rebroadcast decisions.
The most immediate danger involves the risk of additional
exposure of impanelled jurors to broadcast of the evidence, or
portions thereof, during the trial. Repeated exposure to powerful evidence is likely to increase its weight in the minds of jurors, resulting in possible prejudice to the defendant.1l 4
However, the existence of safeguards designed to avoid exposure of jurors to prejudicial information renders the interest in
preventing rebroadcast less than compelling. The jury may be
admonished to avoid accounts of the trial in the news media, a
customary precaution. 0 5 Moreover, if there is reason to believe that such admonishment will be ineffective, sequestration
99. Estes, 381 U.S. at 564 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
100. Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
101. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 362-63.
102. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 601 (Brennan, J., concurring).
103. Criden, 501 F. Supp. at 860.
104. It should be noted that the evidence is not, in itself, prejudicial since it will in
all cases have undergone the court's scrutiny for admissibility. See Mitchell, 551 F.2d
at 1261 (pretrial publication of information admitted at trial is generally regarded as
posing less of a threat to impartiality of juries than inadmissible evidence); compare,
e.g., Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952) with, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360
U.S. 310 (1959).
105. See, e.g., Myers, 635 F.2d at 953.
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is available,
and virtually eliminates the problem if
6
employed.

10

Of far greater concern is the effect which broadcast may have
upon trials of implicated defendants, or upon retrials. This
concern underlay the district court's denial of the broadcasters' application in Criden.107 Because of the publicity which
would accompany broadcasting of the evidence, and because of
the enhanced impact that the tapes themselves would have,
the district court in Criden believed it far less likely that a
truly impartial jury could be obtained for the trials of implicated defendants, or retrials, if disclosure were allowed. 108 The
district court rejected the alternatives usually employed for
remedying these problems. Change of venue was deemed of
dubious value given the nationwide dissemination, and delay
between trials would be equally ineffective since "the broadcasters can undoubtedly be relied upon to re-play
the tapes as
10 9
part of their advance coverage of such trials."'
The argument that repeated and enhanced exposure resulting from broadcast may prejudice potential jurors and interfere with future trials is a valid one. Nationwide broadcast of
videotapes greatly increases the number of people with knowledge of their content beyond those in the immediate vicinity of
the trial. Moreover, exposure to the tapes themselves will create a far stronger impression of the events upon the viewers
than reports or transcripts. There is also the acute possibility
that the tapes, or portions thereof, will be ruled inadmissible in
future trials. A clear example of this was offered in Criden:
several portions of one videotape showed a potential defendant
(Criden) "snooping through the contents of the undercover
agent's briefcase '' 10 while alone in the room. These portions
were ruled admissible in the present trial, but would have been
"devastatingly prejudicial""' in a trial against Criden and
hence almost certainly inadmissible.
The risks of juror prejudice in future trials gives rise to powerful arguments against permitting rebroadcast of video evidence. These arguments lose force, however, when viewed in
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562.
Criden, 501 F. Supp. at 861.
Id.
Id.
Criden, 648 F.2d at 828.
Criden, 501 F. Supp. at 862.
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the light of the curative devices designed to negate prejudicial
publicity and the strong public interest in access to courtroom
evidence.
Voir dire remains a traditional and effective means of isolating and eliminating those who have been exposed to the broadcast evidence and who remain so affected by such exposure as
to be unable fairly to decide the issues. The Criden court, relying on Chandler,indicated that the appropriate course to take
in dealing with the spectre of prejudicial publicity was not to
deny access, but to rely primarily upon voir dire examination
at any future trial. 2 In Chandler,the Court pointed out that
any case which generates a great deal of publicity involves the
risk that the right to a fair trial may be compromised." 3 Chandler provides strong justification for the use of devices such as
voir dire and sequestration to nullify any potentially prejudicial effects 4 of broadcast, rather than denying broadcast
altogether.1

The public forum considerations relied upon in Richmond
Newspapers also weigh heavily against denial of access as a
potential solution to this problem. Chief Justice Burger noted
therein that most people today receive information about trials
from the print and electronic media rather than through personal observation." 5 The arguments which thereby favor
broadcast of actual trials clearly apply a fortiori to the broadcast of only those portions of evidence on videotape since the
risk of causing possible prejudice is correspondingly
diminished.
The arguments against broadcast also lose weight when only
potential retrials are involved. The court in Criden noted that
denial of access because of the potential effects upon a possible retrial, would effectively deny the right to copy at a time
when the issues remained a matter of public interest." 6 Thus
the educational and informational benefits of public observation, emphasized in Richmond Newspapers, would never be
available at a meaningful time. This suggests the conclusion
reached in United States v. Mitchell, that "the risk of causing
possible prejudice at a hypothetical second trial does not jus112. Criden, 648 F.2d at 827.
113. Chandler, 449 U.S. at 574.
114. Id. at 574-75.
115. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572-73.
116. Criden, 648 F.2d at 827.
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tify infringing the appellant's right to inspect and copy the
17
tapes."'
A distinction should be maintained between those situations
in which there is potential prejudice and those wherein actual
prejudice will be caused by broadcast. The public's awareness
of news is frequently overestimated, as was illustrated in Myers. There, despite the extraordinary publicity about Abscam
which preceded the trial, approximately half those summoned
for jury duty had no knowledge of Abscam and very few had
more than cursory knowledge." 8 The Myers court also noted
that despite the extraordinary publicity engendered by Watergate, "very likely the most widely reported crime of the past
decade," it was possible to select jurors without such knowledge of events that would prevent them from serving
impartially. 119
Potential prejudice alone-even if a future trial is virtually
certain-should not justify denial of broadcasting. The public
at large should not be "sanitized as if they all would become
jurors in the remaining Abscam trials."' 2 0 The Court in Chandler concluded that an absolute constitutional ban on broadcast coverage of trials could not be justified simply because of
the potential that prejudicial accounts might impair the jury's
21
ability to decide issues uninfluenced by extraneous matters.'
The appropriate safeguard against prejudice resulting from
publication of a trial was "the defendant's right to demonstrate
that the media's coverage of his case-be it printed or broadcast-compromised the ability 22of the particular jury that heard
the case to adjudicate fairly."'
IV
Conclusion
The decision whether to permit copying and broadcasting of
videotape evidence is and should be committed to the "informed discretion" of the trial court. The trial judge has had
the benefit of first-hand observation of the trial, has seen the
117. Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1261 (emphasis in original).
118. Myers, 635 F.2d at 953.

119. Id.
120. Id. at 953-54.
121. Chandler, 449 U.S. at 574-75.
122. Id. at 575.
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tapes and ruled on their admissibility, and has observed the
jury's reaction to them.
In the exercise of such discretion, the common law presumption in favor of access and the public forum values underlying
the First Amendment should be given great weight. These interests should not be overcome merely by a showing of potential prejudice in potential future trials. *A range of curative
devices is available to eliminate the juror who is incapable of
"lay[ing] aside his impression or opinion and render[ing] a
123
verdict based on the evidence presented in court."'
This discretion, accordingly, should be limited by a standard
similar to that in Myers: only the most compelling circumstances should prevent access to evidence when it is in a form
that readily permits sight or sound reproduction without any
significant risk of interfering with fair adjudication.

123. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 723.

